RESEARCH

2018. Structure of Violence and Muslims.” In Abdul Shaban (ed.) Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence. New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., pp. 145-162. (Link).

—Shorter version published as “Violence Inflicted on Muslims: Direct, Cultural and Structural.” Economic and Political Weekly 4(46):69-76.

"Long-Run Effects of Religious Institutions on Development"

The question of why some places develop and democratize successfully while others fail has long been a topic of interest. Despite the widespread presence of similar economic and political institutions globally, divergence in development and democratization is acutely observable today. Conventional scholarship models these institutions as operating in an institutional tabula rasa. I theorize that success in long-run development and democratic performance is affected by institutional configuration of historical religious institutions. I classify these as centralized and decentralized in character, wherein the centralized religious institutions are driven by the elite in the preindustrial imperial-agrarian core, while the decentralized religious institutions are driven by the religious entrepreneur in the agrarian frontiers. While the former is patronage-dependent, hierarchal, and limited to elite access, the latter is market-dependent, with no barrier to access, and provides a public space. I argue that the decentralized religious institution effects more local markets, market-participation, structural transformation, and public goods provision in the long-run. The mechanism being the wider civic and political preferences engendered by decentralized religious institutions measured by higher voluntary public good provision and electoral competition, respectively. The reverse is true for the centralized institutions. The differences in the behavioral preferences anchored by these religious institutions have a durable effect on development and democratic outcomes in opposing ways.

Since many factors differ across countries, it is challenging to deduce the role of the religious institution type in the development and democratic divergence. Examining the divergence within a single country, India, where the legacies of both religious institution types exist, is useful in explaining the divergence. I theoretically account and empirically test for the long-run effects of two such medieval Muslim religious institutions, the Madrasa Dar-ul-Uloom and Sufi Khanaqah. Unlike the religious clergy’s Madrasa, which served in the imperial-agrarian core, the Khanaqah mainly diffused through the countryside in an expanding agrarian frontier. Khanaqah was founded as a residential hospice, lodge, and public kitchen. To test my theory, I conduct statistical tests with data collected from multiple government censuses at the village and constituency levels. It includes the location of both types of historical religious institutions as well as development and democratic outcomes. I find robust support for my hypotheses. To substantiate my claims, I also examine two case studies conducted during dissertation fieldwork in southern and eastern India, utilizing private archives of Khanaqahs, interviews with stakeholders, and observations from everyday interactions, group discussions, and participation. 

“Political Returns to Risk-Sharing: Evidence from Microcredit Groups”

“Mechanisms of Cultural Coordination: Market Participation and Ethnic Peace”

“Electoral Competition and Extreme Speech on Twitter.” (with Joyojeet Pal and Anmol Panda)

“Local Effect of Religious Institution on Infant Mortality in India” (with Muzna Alvi)